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Abstract
This paper proposes a concept of the core for games with diﬀerential
information, using Aumann’s notion of common knowledge. The concept
is applied to solve the syndicate problem, for cases in which members have
diﬀerent private information on the uncertain prospects of each syndicate
action and the contract (the risk sharing rule and the decision rule) is to
be determined before they exchange their information.
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Introduction

A group of individuals forms a syndicate to make a common decision under uncertainty that will result in a payoﬀ to be shared jointly among them. The formation of a syndicate is typically motivated by the existence of complementary
economic resources such as technology, wealth endowment, and information, as
well as by the prospect of mutual risk sharing. In order to enhance cooperation
among the individuals, they must reach agreement on the terms of a contract
specifying the course of action to be taken jointly and a rule for sharing the
payoﬀ accruing to the syndicate. This paper provides a conceptual framework
to determine the optimal contract.
Wilson’s work [20] has been the source of various studies on risk sharing and
group decision making. By using Pareto optimality as the normative criterion,
he derived the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for linearity of the sharing rule,
and for existence of a group utility function and an aggregation of the members’ probability assessments. Rosing [16] and Wallace [19] required a stronger
qualiﬁcation for aggregation of individual preferences in the form of a group
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utility function and group probability assessments: the Pareto optimal utility
frontiers corresponding to all possible decisions must not cross. They then independently found that the group choice behavior was consistent with the Savage
axioms only in the restrictive situation in which either (i) the individual utility
functions have constant risk tolerances (i.e., exponential utilities) or (ii) there is
agreement on the probability judgment and the individual utility functions have
constant and identical risk cautiousness (i.e., exponential, logarithmic or power
utilities).1 In addition, Rosing showed that if Nash’s bargaining solution is used
to determine the particular point to be chosen from each Pareto frontier, then
the individual preference orderings of all decisions are identical. This paper is
motivated by the more operational interest of solving the problem, independent
of whether a nice aggregation theorem is available or not. Hence, we will employ
a normative criterion for a solution which is stronger than Pareto optimality.
An important subject to be incorporated into our model is information. It
is widely observed that diﬀerent people assign diﬀerent subjective probabilities
to the same event. One can simply attribute this phenomenon to diﬀerences in
beliefs or opinions. All the work cited above is based on this assumption, as
is, for example, the notion of bets among several agents. The view is, in fact,
very prevalent in traditional economic theory, not to mention the Arrow-Debreu
general equilibrium theory for economies under uncertainty (Arrow [1], Debreu
[6]) and Lintner’s model of capital asset prices [12].2
In contrast, one can take the opposite view that discrepancies among individual probability judgments should be traced exclusively to diﬀerences in the
information they have acquired about the world as a result of their divergent
historical experiences. The probability assessment of each agent, then, could be
interpreted as conditional probability assessment which is derived from one and
the same prior probability measure on the underlying state space, conditioned
by the information available only to himself. Such a view has been eloquently
set forth by Harsanyi [9] in his work on noncooperative games with incomplete
information.
These two views have opposite implications when communication is allowed
among agents. If diﬀerent probability judgments are solely due to diﬀerences
in personal beliefs, then the probability numbers will not be revised by mutual
discussions. On the other hand, if diﬀerent probability judgments are due to differences in information, and if the individuals honestly reveal their information
to each other, then, by correct calculations, they will eventually reach agreement on the probability judgment. In an intriguing paper [4] Aumann proved
the following statement: If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors
for a given event are common knowledge, then these posteriors must be equal
even though they may base their posteriors on quite diﬀerent information.3 This
1 Wilson

[20] calls this the case of a linear, determinate sharing rule.

2 Radner

[15] introduces diﬀerential information into his equilibrium model of an economy
under uncertainty, but he maintains the assumption that traders come to the market with the
same prior information.
3 The

key concept in this statement is common knowledge. The deﬁnition is given in Section
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implies that the process of (honestly) exchanging information on the posterior
probabilities of a given event will continue until these values are equal. Aumann
suggests this result as possible evidence against the Harsanyi doctrine. It is, in
fact, a bitter pill for proponents of the Harsanyi doctrine to swallow, since the
exchange of mere probability numbers, not of the full information, is shown to
be suﬃcient to deny the possibility that people having the same priors settle
with divergent probability judgments, or that people agree to disagree. In this
paper we choose not to discuss this philosophical issue but, instead, take an
eclectic standpoint; namely, we will allow situations in which diﬀerent agents
have diﬀerent priors as well as diﬀerent information.
And yet the assumption of the presence of diﬀerential information necessitates introducing a new set of solution concepts that replaces such fundamental
cooperative concepts as eﬃciency (Pareto optimality) and the core. An individual who has superior private information may seek to strengthen his bargaining
power by hiding his information, and those who have poorer information may
react by insuring themselves against the unknown information. This salient feature of diﬀerential information would not be reﬂected adequately in the solution,
if one should simply build the notions of eﬃciency and the core by taking each
agent’s preferences as deﬁned by his current information.
In this paper we propose a new concept of the core to cope with this informational problem. The basic assumption of our core concept is that the syndicate
members are unwilling to reveal their private information in the negotiation process. This assumption is embodied in our deﬁnition of blocking, which involves
Aumann’s notion of common knowledge. Loosely speaking, we assume that an
agent declares his intention to join a blocking coalition only when it is common
knowledge for the coalition members that he would intend to join.
A particular point of the core is deﬁned to be an equilibrium. It is analogous
to deﬁning the Walrasian equilibrium in the core of an economy with private
goods. Arrow [1] and Debreu [6] extended the notion of Walrasian equilibrium
to economies under uncertainty, assuming that the market oﬀers a complete set
of state-contingent claims. Under the presence of diﬀerential information, the
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium distorts the allocation in favor of an agent having
superior information, since he can sell to informationally inferior agents a contract for delivery contingent on an event which he knows will not occur. The
recent theory of the rational-expectations equilibrium (for example, Grossman
[11]) remedies this deﬁciency by incorporating a signaling mechanism into their
model–uninformed agents may be able to infer the information by observing
prevailing prices and/or trading volumes. In contrast, our equilibrium notion
corrects the distortion by imposing a special type of quantity constraints, which
we interpret as the prohibition of “inside trades.”
Section 2 provides the formulation of the syndicate problem. In Section 3
we deﬁne the concepts of conditional eﬃciency and the conditional core, and in
Section 4 we deﬁne our equilibrium notion, which is called the constrained competitive equilibrium. Section 5 provides the basic set of mathematical assump3 of this paper. It will play a crucial role in our construction.
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tions which is required for subsequent theoretical results. The main result of
Section 6 is that an equilibrium contract belongs to the core. Section 7 provides
an existence theorem for equilibrium contracts. In Section 8 we give a simple
example of the syndicate problem and analyze the nature of the equilibrium
contract, assuming that the agents have (1) logarithmic and (2) exponential
utility functions.

2

Formulation

The syndicate problem is modeled as a game characterized by (i) a set of states,
together with a σ-ﬁeld of events; (ii) a set of agents, each of whom is described
by a probability measure on the state space, risk preferences, and information;
(iii) each coalition’s opportunity for joint actions.

The State Space
Let Ω be a set, to be interpreted as the set of alternatives states. Associated
with Ω is a σ-ﬁeld of events, or measurable subsets, denoted by F ; thus, (Ω,F )
is a measurable space. The occurrence of an event is determined by Nature
and is beyond the control of any of the agents. The measurable space (Ω,F )
together with a probability measure on F deﬁnes a probability space.
The information of an agent is described by a sub-σ-ﬁeld of events that he
can discern. He can discern an event E if and only if he knows whether the
prevailing state is in the event E or in the complementary event Ω \ E. For
example, if an agent observes the value of a real-valued random variable y that is
measurable with respect to (w.r.t.) F ,4 then the corresponding sub-σ-ﬁeld, say
G , is the ﬁeld of events that are the inverse images by y of Borel sets in the reals
(R). The random variable y induces a partition of Ω such that each member
of the partition is a minimal nonempty event in G . Instead of dealing with a
general sub-σ-ﬁeld as information, we assume that any information G has this
property: It contains a partition of Ω whose members are minimal nonempty
events in G . We call this partition the ﬁnest partition of G . Then, precisely one
member of the partition is known by the agent to contain the prevailing state.
G (w) denotes the unique member of the partition containing the state w. If
the prevailing state is w, an agent having information G is informed that the
prevailing state is in the event G (w), or, in other words, he observes the event
G (w).

Agents
A ﬁnite set N denotes the set of all agents. Each agent i has subjective probability judgment on events, which is given by a probability measure µi on (Ω,F ).
His risk preferences are represented by a real-valued utility function ui , in which
4 A real-valued function y deﬁned on Ω is said to be measurable w.r.t. F if {w : y(w) ≤
y} ∈ F for each real number y.
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ui (x, w) is his utility of having x wealth units in state w. We assume that each
ui (x, ·) is F -measurable for each x.
We assume that all the agents have common information on the day when
the contract is delivered. Let H denote the sub-σ-ﬁeld of F that represents
this information. A wealth share is an H -measurable random variable. Agent
i’s utility of a wealth share x is the random variable ui [x] that is deﬁned by
ui [x](w) = ui (x(w), w) for each w.
Each agent initially has private information. It is denoted by Gi where Gi
is contained in the sub-σ-ﬁeld H . We will later assume that µi (Gi (w)) > 0 for
each i and w. If w is the prevailing state, agent i prefers a wealth share x to
another x if and only if Ei {ui [x]|Gi }(w) > Ei {ui [x ]|Gi }(w).5 Namely, agent i
prefers x and x at state w iﬀ the conditional expected utility of x (w.r.t. the
prior probability measure µi ) given the information Gi is larger than that of
x . The formulation allows null information. That Gi is the null ﬁeld, {φ, Ω},
for every i corresponds to the situation in which there is initially no private
information.
Beside the initial information, the agents may obtain additional information
from external sources by the time they take a joint action. Let Gi denote agent
i’s information when a joint action is taken. We assume that H ⊃ Gi ⊃ Gi for
each i ; namely, no one forgets his previous information. We assume without
loss of generality that the meet of Gi , denoted by ∧i∈N Gi , is the null partition;6
that is, the minimal event that everyone knows to be prevailing is Ω.

Coalitions
Each nonempty subset of N is called a coalition. This includes N itself, as
well as coalitions of a single agent. The action space of a coalition C, denoted
by A(C), is the set of all joint actions available for the coalition. A function
z C : A(C) × Ω → R denotes the payoﬀ function of coalition C: If C chooses
an action α in A(C) and w is the prevailing state, then the coalition obtains
z c (α, w) wealth units. We assume that z C (α, ·) is H -measurable for each α. It
is an important restriction of our model that there be no physical externality
among the actions of disjoint coalitions.
A contract that a coalition C proposes for its members is described by a
strategy and a sharing plan. A strategy is a function δ C from Ω to A(C), which
speciﬁes a joint action that coalition C takes in each state. To examine fully the
cooperative nature of the problem, we assume that each coalition utilizes the
5 Given a probability space (Ω,F , µ ) and a sub-σ-ﬁeld G , the conditional expectation of
i
i
an F -measurable random variable y is denoted by Ei {y|Gi }. It is a Gi -measurable random
variable which is deﬁned by

Ei {y|Gi } (w) =
y(w)dµi (w)/µi (Gi (w)),
∀w ∈ Ω,
Gi (w)

under the assumption that Gi has a ﬁnest partition of Ω.
6 If {G }
i i∈C is a collection of σ-ﬁelds of Ω, then ∧i∈C Gi denotes their meet: It is the
maximal σ-ﬁeld contained in all of them, and it equals the intersection of Gi , i ∈ C.
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full information available to its members on taking an action. Namely, members
of a coalition release their private information honestly and the coalition pools
the information on the date of action. Thus, δ C is required to be measurable
w.r.t. the sub-σ-ﬁeld Vi∈C Gi .7 8 The strategy space of a coalition C is denoted
by ∆(C). A sharing plan, denoted by xC , is a collection of wealth shares xC
i
,one for each member of coalition C A contract δ C , xC  is said to be feasible
at a state w for coalition C if and only if it satisﬁes the inequality:

C C
xC
i (w) ≤ z (δ (w), w).
i∈C

Dates
There are three dates in our model: the initial date or the date of contracting,
the date of action, and the date of contract delivery. Prior to the initial date
the agents observe private information Gi about the prevailing state. At the
initial date, they negotiate to reach a contract-an agreement on the course
of action to be undertaken (or, a strategy) and an agreement on a provision
for allocating the syndicate’s wealth (or, a sharing plan). They may obtain
additional information by the date of action; the new information of agent i is
Gi (⊃ Gi ). The actual action is taken at the date of action following the strategy
speciﬁed in the contract and the information currently available to the syndicate.
A new information, due to the larger σ-ﬁeld H , is revealed to everyone at the
date of contract delivery. The syndicate’s wealth is realized, and each member
receives his share of wealth.

3

Conditional Core and Conditional Eﬃciency

We use the concept of the core to deﬁne solutions to the syndicate problem.
The basic idea is to select those contracts which have the property that if one is
proposed no subset of agents has an incentive to opt for an alternative contract.
In the terminology of game theory, the core consists of contracts which no
coalition of agents can block. A coalition of agents can block a contract if it can
propose an alternative contract which is enforceable by a collective action of
the coalition members, and under which every member of the coalition is made
better oﬀ. The notion of eﬃciency (Pareto optimality), which is less stringent
a notion, considers possibilities of blocking only by the grand coalition, or the
coalition consisting of all agents: A contract is eﬃcient (Pareto optimal) if it is
not blocked by the grand coalition.
It is straightforward to deﬁne blocking, the core, and eﬃciency for games
in which players’ preferences over a set of possible contracts are ﬁxed (see, for
7 If {G }
i i∈C is a collection of σ-ﬁelds of Ω, then ∨i∈C Gi denotes their join: It is the minimal
σ-ﬁeld containing all Gi , i ∈ C.
8 A function δC : Ω → A(C) is said to be measurable w.r.t. a σ-ﬁeld G if and only if
{w : δC (w) = α} ∈ G for each α ∈ A(C).
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example, Scarf [17]). However, it is not so straightforward when agents have
diﬀerent information. The diﬃculty lies in the statement that “every member
of the coalition is made better oﬀ.” To deﬁne the content of this statement,
one must cope with the prospect of communication; namely, various blocking
actions taken by players in negotiation processes may evoke the exchange of
information, which may result in shifts of their preferences.
Wilson [22] investigates the issue by considering a number of core notions
which diﬀer in the degree to which communication is permitted among players. In this paper we assume that players agree not to exchange their private
information at the negotiation table. Agents with superior information may be
reluctant to communicate, in anticipation of reaching a favorable agreement by
hiding their information. Even if formal communication is prohibited, there still
remain possibilities of leakage of information via the announcements of players’
intentions to or not to participate in a blocking coalition. They may possess a
range of manipulative strategies to control the “amount” of information leakage via a consistent course of action, particularly by incorporating the device
of randomization. This is an interesting topic in the theory of noncooperative
games (see, for example, Ponssard [13]), but, as such, it is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The core whose deﬁnition will be given subsequently is identical to the Wilson coarse core. We will set forth this concept using Aumann’s notion of common knowledge. Basically, we intend to eliminate those contracts which, if they
are proposed, are likely to be blocked by some coalition without involving any
exchange of information among its members.
We start by deﬁning the agents’ preferences for contracts. An agent’s preference for a contract is solely determined by the wealth share assigned to him,
namely:
Deﬁnition 1. An agent i, in a state w, prefers a contract which assigns him a
wealth share x to another contract which assigns him a wealth share x if and
only if
Ei {ui [x]|Gi } (w) > Ei {ui [x ]|Gi } (w).
The next step is to give content to the statement that “every member of
a coalition is made better oﬀ” by a contract. By this statement we will mean
more than just that every member of a coalition prefers one contract to another.
The notion of common knowledge plays a key role. To take a coalition of two
agents, by the above statement we will require not only that both 1 and 2 prefer
one contract to another, but also that 1 knows that 2 prefers one to another, 2
knows that 1 prefers one to another, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 prefers one
to another, and so on. Formally, we deﬁne the notion of common knowledge as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a coalition C and a state w, an event E is said to be
common knowledge at state w for coalition C if and only if E includes the
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member of the ﬁnest partition of the meet ∧i∈C Gi that contains w; namely,


E ⊃ ∧ Gi (w)
i∈C

Deﬁnition 3. A contract is blocked at a state w by a coalition C if and only if
there exists an alternative contract having the following property: It is common
knowledge at state w for coalition C that (i) it is feasible for C, and (ii) no
member of the coalition prefers the originally proposed contract to the alternative
contract, and at least one member prefers the alternative contract.
Deﬁnition 4. The conditional core is the set of all contracts that have the
following property: At each state w in Ω, (i) they are feasible for N ; (ii) no
coalition can block them. A contract is conditionally eﬃcient if and only if at
each state w in Ω, (i) it is feasible for N ; (ii) coalition N cannot block it.
To see that the formal deﬁnition of common knowledge is equivalent to the
informal description, take a coalition of two agents. Suppose that w is the true
state and E is an event. To say that 1 knows E at state w means that E includes
the observed event G1 (w) To say that 1 knows at state w that 2 knows E means
that, for any state w in G1 (w), E includes the event G2 (w ) . To say that 1
knows at state w that 2 knows that 1 knows E means that, for any state w in
G1 (w) and w in G2 (w ), E includes the event G1 (w ). And so on. In general,
call a state w reachable from w if there is a sequence of events E1 , E2 , . . . , Ek
such that w ∈ E1 , w ∈ Ek , and consecutive Ej intersect and belong to the
ﬁnest partitions of two diﬀerent agents. Then all the sentences of the form “i1
knows at state w that i2 knows that i3 knows ... E” (where i1 = i2 , i2 = i3 , . . .)
are true if and only if E contains all w reachable from w. But the set of all w
reachable from w coincides with that member of the ﬁnest partition of the meet
∧i∈C Gi that contains w; so the desired equivalence is established.9
To deﬁne the notion of blocking that is not subject to leakage of information,
it is central to require that it is common knowledge for every member of a
blocking coalition that all of them prefer the counterproposal to the proposed
contract–or, to be more precise, that none of them prefer the proposed contract
to the counterproposal and at least one of them prefers the counterproposal.
To illustrate the point, suppose that Ω has two states w1 , w2 of equal prior
probability and consider a coalition of two risk-averse agents. Agent 1 has
the partition {{w1 }, {w2 }} and agent 2 has the null partition {w1 , w2 }. The
prevailing state is w1 (which 1 knows but 2 does not). A contract is proposed
that will provide agent 1 and agent 2 with 0 and 1 wealth units, respectively,
if the state is w1 ; and 1 and 0 wealth units, respectively, if the state is w2 .
Consider the alternative contract that will provide each agent with 1/2 wealth
units for certain. Obviously, 1 is better oﬀ with the counterproposal and 2 is
also better oﬀ; but 2 does not know if 1 is better oﬀ. Thus, it is not common
knowledge that 1 and 2 both prefer the counter-proposal. If both announce
9 This

argument is due to Aumann [4].
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their intentions to block the original contract, 2 will immediately learn that the
true state must be w1 and will decline to participate in the blocking coalition.
For another example, suppose that Ω has four states w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 of equal
probability, and consider again a coalition of two risk-averse agents. Let agent
1’s partition be
{{w1 , w2 }, {w3 , w4 }}
and agent 2’s partition be
{{w1 , w2 , w3 }, {w4 }},
and suppose the prevailing state is w1 . A contract is proposed that will provide
agent 1 and agent 2 with 1/2 wealth units if w1 prevails; 0 and 1 wealth units,
respectively, if either w2 or w4 prevails; and 1 and 0 wealth units, respectively, if
w3 prevails. Consider again the alternative contract that will provide each with
1/2 wealth units for certain. With this counterproposal 1 and 2 know that both
of them are better oﬀ. But 2 does not know if 1 knows that 2 is better oﬀ; so it
is not common knowledge that 1 and 2 both prefer the counterproposal. If they
announce their favor for the sure contract, it will become common knowledge
that the true state is not w4 . Note that although 1 and 2 knew in advance
from their private information that the true state is not w4 , it was not common
knowledge before the announcements. Now 2 does not know any more whether
1 prefers the sure contract, because if the true state is w3 then 1 can identify the
state by his private information and the original contract will provide him with
the maximal 1 wealth unit. Nevertheless, their favor for the counterproposal is
still unchanged and hence neither one would turn it down. Then 2 will learn
that the true state is not w3 and that he is worse oﬀ with the counterproposal.
Thus, although both agents at ﬁrst favored to block the proposed contract, the
sequence of announcements and reasoning lead agent 2 to learn eventually that
the true state is either w1 or w2 , thereby to decline to form the proposed blocking
coalition. Even though it may be initially to every member’s interest to turn
down a proposed contract and opt for another, the agreement among coalition
members to block is successfully reached without any leakage of information if
and only if it is common knowledge that every member prefers to block.10
It is important to note that the conditional core of Deﬁnition 4 does not
depend on the agents’ initial observations. One may propose an alternative
deﬁnition of the core in which a core contract at a state is such that it is not
blocked by any coalition at that state, thus associating the core to each prevailing
state. The following simple example illustrates the deﬁciency of this deﬁnition.
Consider a syndicate problem of two agents in, which there is no opportunity
of actions. Each agent has random wealth endowment, and the syndicate’s role
10 One can construct an example in which the successive leakage of information does not
alter members’ original intentions to block. For example, consider the situation dealt with in
the second example above, and suppose that a contract is proposed that will provide 1 and
2 with 1 and 0 wealth units if either w1 or w3 prevails and 0 and 1 wealth units otherwise.
Consider the same alternative contract as before. Then 2 will eventually learn that the true
state is either w1 or w2 , but his preference of the sure contract over the original contract will
be unaltered. Our deﬁnition fails to recognize this possibility of blocking.
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is merely to reallocate the wealth for the purpose of mutual insurance. There
are two states w1 and w2 . Assume that the wealth endowment of each agent
is the same as that the proposed contract provided him in the ﬁrst example.
Assume that the information of each agent is also the same as before. Then, the
sure contract of giving 1/2 wealth units to each agent would be a core contract
at state w1 . It is feasible at each state; neither agent 1 nor agent 2 blocks it
by himself, and the coalition of 1 and 2 cannot block it either. (For the twomember coalition to block it, they must ﬁnd another feasible contract which
will give agent 1 more than 1/2 wealth units in states w1 and w2 , because of
the common knowledge requirement for blocking. Such a contract will make
agent 2 worse oﬀ.) This contract is extremely favorable to agent 1. He has no
wealth endowed in the prevailing state (and he knows what the prevailing state
is!), but he obtains 1/2 wealth units from agent 2. On the other hand, agent
2 knows that if the prevailing state is w2 , agent 1 will block this contract by
himself. Hence, by observing that agent 1 did not exert his blocking power,
agent 2 knows the true state and declines to accept the sure contract.
To prohibit the information leakage to outside agents via a blocking or nonblocking action of a coalition, we require that a core contract be such that it
is common knowledge for everyone that no coalition blocks the contract. But,
since ∧i∈N Gi = {φ, Ω} by assumption, this is equivalent to the requirement in
Deﬁnition 4, namely that no coalition blocks the contract at each state. The
core of the above example, then, consists only of the initial endowment. Clearly,
the conditional core concept is identical to the ordinary core concept when there
is no diﬀerential information.

4

Constrained Competitive Equilibrium
Contracts

The conditional core usually contains a continuum of contracts. Thus, we have
the problem of choosing a contract from the core. Unfortunately, no operational
method is available to identify all the core contracts. In this section we provide
a stronger concept of constrained competitive equilibria, which enables us to
mathematically identify one or a subset of the core contracts.
Let Π denote the set of all probability measures on (Ω, F ), whose element
is generically denoted by π. The expectation of a random variable y on the
probability space (Ω, F , π) is denoted by Eπ {y}.
Deﬁnition 5. A budget plan, d, is a collection of n functions di : Π × Ω → R,
i ∈ N such that
∈ Π, (i)di (π, ·) is measurable w.r.t.Gi and
 for each π 



(ii)
Eπ
di (π, ·) = sup Eπ z N (δ N (·), ·) .
δ N ∈∆(N )
i∈N
Given a probability measure π, a budget plan speciﬁes a collection of random
budgets, one for each member of the syndicate. The random budget assigned
to each member is measurable w.r.t. his initial information; that is, he is given
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a budget which he can spend to “purchase” a wealth share, depending on the
information he has on the initial date. Condition (ii) above requires that the expected sum of individual budgets must equal the syndicate’s maximum expected
wealth, in which the expectations are taken using the probability measure π.
N

Deﬁnition 6. A contract δ̄ , x̄N  is said to be a constrained competitive equilibrium contract relative to a budget plan d = {di }i∈N iﬀ there exists a probability measure π̄ in Π such that

N
N
∀w ∈ Ω.
(i)
x̄N
i (w) = z (δ̄ (w), w),
i∈N



N
(ii)
Eπ̄ z N (δ̄ (·), ·) ≥ Eπ̄ z N (δ N (·), ·) , ∀δ N ∈ ∆(N ), and
(iii)for each i and w
and
(a)
Eπ̄ x̄N
i |Gi ≤ di (π̄, w),
(w)
≥
E
(b)
Ei ui (x̄N
(·),
·)|G
i
i {ui (xi (·), ·)|Gi } (w)
i
for any wealth share xi of agent i satisfying (a).
These conditions can be restated as follows. Condition (i) says that the
contract allocates all the syndicate wealth to its members. Condition (ii) says
that the equilibrium strategy must attain the syndicate’s maximum expected
wealth, in which the expectation is taken using the probability measure π̄.
Condition (iii) says that the equilibrium wealth share of each agent is such
that (a) its expectation w.r.t. π̄ conditional on the initial information does not
exceed his budget, and (b) the equilibrium wealth share yields his maximum
preference among all wealth shares satisfying the budget constraint.
One can interpret the constrained competitive equilibrium contract as the
competitive (or Walrasian) outcome of a hypothetical market for state-contingent
claims. A claim contingent on a state w entitles its purchaser to one unit
of wealth on the date of delivery if the true state is w. For a sharing plan
N
xN = {xN
i }i∈N , xi (w) is then the number of w-contingent claims that agent i
purchases in the market. Given a strategy of the syndicate δ N , z N (δ N (w), w)
is the total supply of w-contingent claims. The informational restraint on the
date of contract delivery imposes the condition that the “commodity bundles”
that can be traded in this market are “bundles” of state-contingent claims
which are measurable w.r.t. the then prevailing informational ﬁeld H . A
probability measure π in Π is interpreted as a price system; namely, if π is
the prevailing price system, the market value of a wealth share x is given by
x(w)dπ(w) ≡ Eπ {x}.11
Ω
The peculiarity of this hypothetical market lies in the deﬁnition of “consumers” in this market. Each agent is split into a number of consumers, who
act independently having diﬀerent amounts of budgets and diﬀerent preferences.
Each consumer who is generated by agent i is associated with a member of
the ﬁnest partition of Gi ; thus, a consumer is represented by a pair (i, Ei ),
11 Later, we will restrict π to the measurable subspace (Ω, H ) and require that π(E) = 0
for each E ∈ H such that µi (E) = 0, ∀i .
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in which i ∈ N and Ei = Gi (w) for some w. The preferences of consumer
(i, Ei ) are deﬁned in such a way that his preference for a wealth share x is
given by the conditional expected utility Ei ui (x(w), w)dµi (w)/µi (Ei ). For the
technical convenience of avoiding insatiable preferences, one may restrict consumption sets of the consumers such that consumer (i, Ei ) may not purchase
any claim contingent on a state outside Ei . There is only one “producer” in
this market, whose technological possibilities are deﬁned by the strategy space
∆(N ) and the payoﬀ function z N of the syndicate. A strategy δ N generates
supply of state-contingent claims, whose market value (or proﬁt) is given by
z N (δ N (w), w)dπ(w) ≡ Eπ {z N (δ N (·), ·)} if the prevailing price system is π.
Ω
This proﬁt is distributed among the consumers according to a budget plan d.12
Then the conditions deﬁning a constrained competitive equilibrium are simply that the producer maximizes his proﬁt, that each consumer purchases the
most preferred commodity bundle subject to his budget constraint, and that
total supply equals total demand, which is the standard requirement for a competitive equilibrium. Note that if each consumer exhausts his budget (i.e.,
Eπ {xi |Gi }(w) = di (π, w)
and if δ N maximizes proﬁt at π, then condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 5 yields

 
N
N
xi (w) − z (δ (w), w) dπ(w) = 0,
Ω

i∈N

which, is the Walras’ law.
The peculiar feature of the concept of constrained competitive equilibria is
the prohibition of “inside trades.” An agent i’s choice at a state w is restricted to
trading claims contingent on states which belong to the prevailing event Gi (w).
He is not allowed to generate income by selling short the claims contingent on a
state which he knows will never occur. This is in constrast to the Arrow-Debreu
equilibria which are constructed on the basis of agents’ posterior preferences.
As Radner [15] states:
If an agent knew that an event E obtained, but not all agents knew
this, the agent in question might ﬁnd himself in a position in which
he could sell, at a positive price, a contract for delivery contingent
on an event that he already knew could not occur. Caveat emptor
! Whether or not this raises any moral questions, it does raise the
question of whether or not an agent’s information includes knowledge of other agents’ information structures. In the real world of
12 For

this interpretation, express the budget constraint (a) of condition (iii) as

x̄N (w )dπ̄(w ) ≤ di (π̄, w) · π̄(Gi (w))
Gi (w)

and regard the quantity on the right-hand side as the proﬁt distributed to the consumer
(i, Gi (w)).
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contracts between individuals, this question does arise. For example, it is not considered correct to make a bet on the outcome of
a race whose results you already know. But in the Arrow-Debreu
world, individuals make contracts with an impersonal “market”, so
this issue does not arise, and individuals are free to make such contracts.
The prohibition of “inside trades” distinguishes our equilibrium concept from
the concept of the Arrow-Debreu equilibria and motivates the name constrained
competitive equilibria. Of course, if there is no diﬀerential information, then
the two equilibrium concepts coincide.
If π is the relevant probability measure (price system) to compute the expected wealth (proﬁt) and w is the prevailing state, then a coalition C can claim
a budget of at least the amount




C C
sup Eπ z (δ (·), ·)  ∧ Gi (w),
i∈C
δ C ∈∆(C)
since the coalition can obtain this amount by acting independently using its opportunity for joint actions. The following property of a budget plan is necessary
to ensure that a constrained competitive equilibrium contract is a core contract.
Deﬁnition 7. A budget plan d = {di }i∈N is said to be core-compatible iﬀ it
satisﬁes, for each coalition C and for each π ∈ Π, the inequality:





Eπ
di (π, ·)  ∧ Ei (w)
i∈C
i∈C




≥
sup Gπ z C (δ C (·), ·)  ∧ Gi (w),
∀w ∈ Ω.
i∈C
δ ∈∆(C)
In Section 6 we will prove that constrained competitive equilibrium contracts
are in the conditional core if the budget plan is chosen to be core-compatible.
But nothing thus far indicates that the equilibrium solution plays a privileged
role over other core contracts. Debreu and Scarf [7] show for an exchange economy consisting of a ﬁnite number of types of consumers that the core shrinks
to the set of competitive equilibria as the number of each type becomes inﬁnite. They also extend the theorem to the case of a productive economy with
constant-returns-to-scale technology. Instead of “replicating” an economy, Aumann [3] considers an economy with a continuum of traders and shows that the
core and the set of competitive equilibria coincide. It seems natural to conjecture that a similar theorem is available for our syndicate problem. If the
syndicate is a large organization consisting of a continuum of agents so that
every agent is “insigniﬁcant” relative to the total, the constrained competitive
equilibrium contracts would be the only solutions to the problem that are free
from coalition oppositions. On the other hand, if the size of the syndicate is
small it is diﬃcult to favor the equilibrium contracts over others on sound ethical ground. However, the equilibrium contracts are amenable to mathematical
analysis and have appealing properties, as will be exhibited in Section 8.
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We earlier deﬁned a wealth share to be a real-valued random variable measurable
w.r.t. the sub-σ-ﬁeld H , in which H is the information available to everyone on
the day of contract delivery. But, the set of all H -measurable random variables
is too large to be mathematically manageable. Thus, we restrict the space of
wealth shares in the following way.
Given the individual probability measures µi on (Ω, F ), deﬁne a new probability measure µ by
µ(E) =

1
µi (E),
n

∀E ∈ F ,

i∈N

in which n is the number of agents in N . As we only deal with H -measurable
wealth shares, we restrict to µ the measurable space(Ω, H ). For a random
variable x on (Ω, H , µ) deﬁne the essential supremum by
ess sup |x(w)| = inf sup |x(w)|,
E w∈Ω\E

where E ranges over the µ-null subsets of Ω. Let L∞ (Ω, H , µ) denote the
space of all essentially bounded, real-valued, H -measurable functions on Ω,
considering two functions in L∞ to be equivalent iﬀ they are equal almost
everywhere. Namely,
L∞ (Ω, H , µ) = {x : Ω → R|x is H -measurable and ess sup |x(w)| < ∞} .
With the norm
x

∞

= ess sup |x(w)|,

L∞ (Ω, H , µ) is a normed linear space. We will take the wealth shares in this
space.
We impose the following assumptions on each agent’s set of wealth shares
and his utility function.
Assumption 1. For each i, (i) the set of wealth shares of agent i is
bi
(Ω, H , µ) ≡ L∞ (Ω, H , µ) ∩ {x : Ω → R|x(w) ≥ bi a.e.} ,
L∞

in which bi is a nonnegative number. The utility function ui is a function from
[bi , ∞) × Ω to R such that (ii) for each w, ui (x, w) is a continuous, concave,
and strictly increasing function of x such that ui (bi , w) = 0, and (iii) for each
x, ui (x, ·) is integrable on (Ω, F , µi ).
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, if x is in L∞ (Ω, H , µ), then the function ui [x] : Ω → R, deﬁned by ui [x](w) = ui (x(w), w), ∀w ∈ Ω, is measurable
w.r.t.F and Ei {ui [x]|Gi } is ﬁnite-valued for each i.
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Proof: Let x ∈ L∞ . To show that ui [x] is measurable w.r.t. F , deﬁne xK
for each positive integer K by
k
k+1
k
if
≤ x(w) <
,
− ∞ < k < ∞.
K
K
K
For each real number u, we have



 
∞ 

k
k
w : ui (xK (w), w) ≤ u =
,w ≤ u .
w : xK (w) =
∩ w : ui
K
K
xK (w) =

k=−∞

The set {w : xK (w) = k/K} is in H and the set {w : ui (k/K, w) ≤ u}
is in F , so the set {w : ui (xK (w), w) ≤ u} is in F ; hence ui [xK ] is F measurable. Since xK (w) → x(w), ∀w, as K → ∞ and ui (x, w) is continuous
in x, ui (xK (w), w) → ui (x(w), w), ∀w. Namely, ui [x] is the (pointwise) limit of
the sequence of F -measurable functions ui [xK ]. Hence, ui [x] is F -measurable.
By the monotonocity of ui (x, w) in x we have
|ui (x(w), w)| ≤ |ui ( x

∞ , w)|

a.e.,

but µ-null events are µi -null so that the same inequality holds almost everywhere
w.r.t. µi . Then, since ui [x] is F -measurable, (iii) implies |ui [x]|dµi < ∞.
Therefore, Ei {ui [x]|Gi } is ﬁnite-valued.
We impose the following assumption on the action opportunity of each coalition.
Assumption 2. For each coalition C, (i) the action space A(C) is a nonempty,
compact, convex, and separable subset of a normed linear space with norm
C
: A(C) × Ω → R satisﬁes: (ii) for each w,
· C
A . The payoﬀ function z
C
z (α, w) is a continuous and concave function of α, (iii) for each α, z C (α, ·)
is in L (Ω, H , µ), and (iv) if δ ∗ : Ω → A(C) is an H -measurable function
satisfying
∀w ∈ Ω,
δ ∗ (w) ∈ arg max z C (α, w),
α∈A(C)

∗

then we have ess sup |z (δ (w), w)| < ∞.13
C

Noting that the strategy space ∆(C) of coalition C is the set of all functions

δ C : Ω → A(C) measurable w.r.t. Vi∈C Gi we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, if δ C is in ∆(C), then the function
z[δ C ] : Ω → R, deﬁned by z C [δ C ](w) = z C (δ C (w), w), ∀w ∈ Ω, is in L∞ (Ω, H , µ).
Proof: Since the set A(C) is separable, it contains a countable dense subset.
Denote this subset by Ad (C) = {αk ; k = 1, 2, . . .}. Given δ C ∈ ∆(C), deﬁne
δC
K : Ω → A(C) for each positive integer K by


1
C
δC
(w)
∈
α
∈
A
(C)
:
α
−
δ(w)
≤
, ∀w ∈ Ω,
d
K
A
K
13 The essential supremum of |zC (δ∗ (w), w)| is well deﬁned, since zC (δ∗ (·), ·) is H measurable due to the following Proposition 2.
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in such a way that δ C
K is measurable w.r.t. Vi∈C Gi . For each real number z, we
have
∞ 




C
(w),
w)
≤
z
=
(w)
=
α
w : z C (δ C
w
:
δ
∩ w : z C (αk , w) ≤ z .
k
K
K
k=1


C
The set {w : δ C
K (w) = αk } is in ∨i∈C Gi and the set {w : z (αk , w) ≤ z}
C C
is in H , so the set {w : z (δ K (w), w) ≤ z} is in H ; hence, z C [δ C
K ] is H C
C
measurable. Since δ C
(w)
→
δ
(w),
∀w,
as
K
→
∞
and
z
(α,
w)
is continK
C C
C C
(w),
w)
→
z
(δ
(w),
w),∀w.
This
implies
that
z
[δ ] is
uous in α, z C (δ C
K
H -measurable. By condition (iv) we have

ess sup |z C (δ C (w), w)| ≤ ess sup |z C (δ ∗ (w), w)| < ∞
and so z C [δ C ] is in L∞ .
A contract that a coalition C proposes for its members is a pair xC =
C
bi
in which xC
i ∈ L∞ (Ω, H , µ), ∀i and δ ∈ ∆(C). Proposition 1
ensures the ﬁniteness of the conditional expected utility Ei {ui [xC
i ]|Gi }. Proposition 2 ensures that the coalition’s payoﬀ z C [δ C ] is in the space
L∞ (Ω, H , µ). Then, Condition (i) of the deﬁnition of constrained competitive
equilibria (Deﬁnition 6) can be replaced by:

N
N
x̄N
a.e.
(w.r.t. µ)
i (w) = z (δ̄ (w), w)
C
{xC
i }i∈C , δ ,

i∈C

The norm dual of L∞ (Ω, H , µ) is ba(Ω, H , µ) under the pairing π · f =
f
(w)dπ(w) ≡ Eπ {f }, ∀f ∈ L∞ and ∀π ∈ ba, where ba(Ω, H , µ) is the
Ω
normed linear space of all bounded additive set functions on (Ω, H ) absolutely
continuous w.r.t. µ with the norm · ba being
 k

π ba = sup
|π(Ei )| : E1 , . . . , Ek is a ﬁnite
i=1

sequence of disjoint sets in H } .14 15
We earlier assumed the equilibrium π to be a probability measure on (Ω, F ).
But, since the wealth shares and the payoﬀs are in L∞ (Ω, H , µ), it is more
natural to take π in the norm dual ba(Ω, H , µ), which ensures that Eπ {f } is
ﬁnite for each f ∈ L∞ . That π is a probability measure requires, in addition,
that π be a countably additive set function. Thus, redeﬁne the set Π to be
14 See, for example, Dunford and Schwarz [8, p. 296]. The norm dual of L
∞ is deﬁned as
the set of all continuous (i.e., bounded) linear functionals on L∞ w.r.t. the topology on L∞
induced by  · ∞
15 A set function π on (Ω, H ) is said to be absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ iﬀ E ∈ H and
µ(E) = 0 implies that π(E) = 0.
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the set of all (countably additive) probability measures on (Ω, H ) absolutely
continuous w.r.t. µ.
Since Eπ {f } is ﬁnite for each f ∈ L∞ , the conditional expectation of an
agent’s wealth share w.r.t. π, which appears in Deﬁnition 6, is ﬁnite. Similarly,
Proposition 2 ensures that the (conditional) expectation w.r.t. π of each coalition’s random payoﬀ associated with any strategy, in Deﬁnitions 5, 6, and 7, is
ﬁnite.
Assumption 3. For each i, the initial information Gi is generated by a ﬁnite
partition of Ω.16 The measure µi assigns a positive probability to each nonempty
event in Gi .
For each coalition C deﬁne the norm
δ

C
∆

= ess sup δ(w)

·
C
A,

C
∆

on its strategy space by
∀δ ∈ ∆(C).

The following proposition ensures that the maximum expected payoﬀ of each
coalition, in Deﬁnitions 5 and 7, exists and is ﬁnite.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the strategy space ∆(C) of each
z C [·]dπ : ∆(C) → R,
coalition C is compact w.r.t. · C
∆ , and the mapping
C
C
deﬁned by z [δ]dπ = z (δ(w), w)dπ(w), is continuous w.r.t. the topology
on ∆(C) induced by · C
∆ for each π ∈ Π.
Proof: Since the action space A(C) of each coalition C is compact, Assumption 3 implies that ∆(C) is compact. By conditions (ii) and (iv) of Assumption
2 we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to show that the mapping
z C [·]dπ is continuous.
The ﬁnal basic assumption involves the notion of balanced collection of coalitions, which originates in Shapley [18]. A collection of coalitions B = {C} is
said to be a balanced
 collection iﬀ there exists nonnegative weights tC , for each
C in B, such that C∈B,Ci tC = 1 for each i in N .
Assumption 4. The action opportunities are balanced in the following sense: If
C
∈ A(C) for each
B is a balanced collection of coalitions with weights tC and α
N
N
C ∈ B, then there exists αN ∈ A(N ) such that z (α , w) ≥ C∈B tC z C (αC , w)
a.e.
This assumption can be interpreted as follows. The weight tC (≤ 1) of a
coalition C is the amount of time for which the coalition is formed. Each agent
is endowed with one unit of time. If a collection of coalitions B = {C} is
a balanced collection, each agent can successfully split his endowed time and
participate in each coalition C which assumes his membership. The agents also
have the option of collectively forming the syndicate, or the coalition N , for
one unit of time. Then, Assumption 4 says that they can collectively achieve a
16 Given any nonempty collection C of subsets of Ω, the minimal σ-ﬁeld containing C is said
to be generated by C .
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higher wealth in each state by participating in the syndicate than by forming
each coalition C in B for tC units of time, regardless of each coalition’s joint
action. As a special case, if B is the collection of disjoint coalitions whose union
is N , then the weight of each coalition is one, and the assumption implies that
it is to the advantage of disjoint coalitions to combine. Thus, Assumption 4
extends the familiar notion of superadditivity to the class of balanced collections
of coalitions.

6

Core-compatibility of the Constrained Competitive Equilibrium

We ﬁrst establish the existence of a core-compatible budget plan.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4, there exists a core-compatible
budget plan.
Proof: Let M denote the set of pairs (i, Ei ), in which i ∈ N and Ei is any
member of the ﬁnest partition of Gi . For each subset C of N and each member
Q of the ﬁnest partition of ∧i∈C Gi , let [C, Q] be the subset of M deﬁned by
[C, Q] = {(i, Ei ) ∈ M : i ∈ C, Ei ⊂ Q} .
Let A denote the collection of all these subsets [C, Q]. Let π be given in
Π. Since di (π, ·) is measurable w.r.t. Gi by deﬁnition, it is a collection of
scalars, one for each member of the ﬁnest partition of Gi . The value di (π, w) is
denoted by di (Ei ) if w ∈ Ei . Then the problem is to ﬁnd the numbers di (Ei ),
(i, Ei ) ∈ M ,that satisfy


di (Ei )µi (Ei ) = sup
z N (δ N (w), w)dπ(w),
N
Ω
δ ∈∆(N )
(i,Ei )∈M
and

(i,Ei )∈[C,Q]


di (Ei )µi (Ei ) ≥

z C (δ C (w), w)dπ(w),

sup
δ

C

∈∆(C)

Q

∀[C, Q] ∈ A .
By the Shapley-Bondareva theorem (Shapley [18]), this system of inequalities
has a solution if and only if

sup
z N (δ N (w), w)dπ(w)
N
Ω
δ ∈∆(N )


≥
t[C,Q] sup
z C (δ C (w), w)dπ(w)
C
Q
δ ∈∆(C)
[C,Q]∈D
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for any balanced collection D of subsets in A with weights t[C,Q] . To show that
this inequality holds, let χQ denote the indicator function of the set Q. Then,
if δ [C,Q] ∈ ∆(C) for each [CQ] ∈ D, we have


t[C,Q]
z C (δ [C,Q] (w), w)dπ(w)
[C,Q]∈D



=

Q



Ω [C,Q]∈D


=



Ω [C,Q]∈D
Qw

t[C,Q] χQ (w)z C (δ [C,Q] (w), w)dπ(w)
t[C,Q] z C (δ [C,Q] (w), w)dπ(w)


≤

z N (δ N (w), w)dπ(w),
Ω

in which the δ N in the ﬁnal expression is the strategy of N whose existence is
guaranteed by Assumption 4. Hence the theorem follows.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, a constrained competitive equilibrium contract relative to a core-compatible budget plan is in the conditional
core.
N

Proof: Suppose that a constrained competitive equilibrium contract δ̄ , x̄N 
relative to a core-compatible budget plan d is blocked at some state w0 by a
coalition C. By the deﬁnition of blocking, there exists a contract δ C , xC  for
coalition C such that



C
C C
xi (w) ≤ z (δ (w), w)
a.e. on
∧ Gi (w0 ),
i∈C

i∈C

and
Ei


ui [xC
i ]|Gi

(w) ≥ Ei

ui [x̄C
i ]|Gi

(w),

∀w ∈



∧ Gi (w0 ),

i∈C

∀i ∈ C,

in which the last inequality is a strict inequality for some i ∈ C. Let π̄ ∈ Π be
the equilibrium probability measure. Then, a strict inequality of the conditional
expected utilities implies
Eπ̄ xC
i |Gi (w) > di (π̄, w).
Similarly, an equality of the conditional expected utilities implies
Eπ̄ xC
i |Gi (w) ≥ di (π̄, w),
bi
by the following reason. Deﬁne i’s wealth share xi ∈ L∞
by xi (w) = xC
i (w)+x,
∀w ∈ Ω, for an arbitrary positive scalar x. Since ui (x, w) is strictly increasing
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in x, we have Ei {ui [xi ]|Gi }(w) > Ei {ui [xC
i ]|Gi }(w). Consider any wealth share
xti deﬁned by xti (w) = txi (w) + (1 − t)xC
i (w),∀w ∈ Ω and 0 < t ≤ 1. By the
concavity of ui (x, w) in x, we get
Ei ui [xti ]|Gi (w)

≥ tEi {ui [xi ]|Gi } (w) + (1 − t)Ei ui [xC
i ]|Gi (w)
> Ei ui [xC
i ]|Gi (w).

This implies Eπ̄ {xti |Gi }(w) ≥ di (π̄, w). By letting t → 0, we obtain
Eπ̄ {xC
i |Gi }(w) ≥ di (π̄, w) due to the dominated convergence theorem. Thus,
0
we obtain Eπ̄ {xC
i |Gi }(w) ≥ di (π̄, w), ∀i ∈ C and ∀w ∈ (∧i∈C Gi )(w ), with at
least one strict inequality. Taking the expectation of each side conditional on
the event (∧i∈C Gi )(w0 ) and summing over all i in C yields










C
0

xi  ∧ Gi (w ) > Eπ̄
di (π̄, ·)  ∧ Gi (w0 ).
Eπ̄
i∈C
i∈C
i∈C

i∈C

But, by feasibility of the contract δ C , xC  the ﬁrst term is less than or equal
to Eπ̄ {z C [δ C ]|∧i∈C Gi }(w0 ); hence,









C C 
0

di (π̄, ·)  ∧ Gi (w0 ).
Eπ̄ z [δ ]  ∧ Gi (w ) > Eπ̄
i∈C

i∈C

i∈C

This contradicts the assumption that d is core-compatible.

7

Existence of Constrained Competitive Equilibrium Contracts

As we stated earlier, a constrained competitive equilibrium is the Walrasian
(or Arrow-Debreu) equilibrium of the aforementioned hypothetical market for
state-contingent claims. Each consumer is represented by a pair (i, Ei ), in which
i ∈ N and Ei is a member of the ﬁnest partition of Gi . The consumption set of
consumer (i, Ei ) is a subset of L∞ (Ω, H , µ), deﬁned by

x : x(w) = x (w)χEi (w) a.e. .
X(i,Ei ) =
bi
x ∈L∞
His preference for a commodity x ∈ X(i,Ei ) is represented by
u (x(w), w)dµi (w)/µi (Ei ). He is endowed with a budget di (π, w0 ) with
Ei i
0
w ∈ Ei , depending on the price system π. Given a price system π, his budget
set is



0
0
x(w)dπ(w) ≤ di (π, w )π(Gi (w )) .
x ∈ X(i,Ei ) :
Ω
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The producer, i.e., the syndicate itself, is represented by a production possibility
set Y , which is a subset of L∞ (Ω, H , µ) deﬁned by

 
Y =
y ∈ L∞ : y(w) ≤ z N (δ N (w), w)a.e. .
δ N ∈∆(N )
We use Bewley’s theorem [5] to show the existence of equilibria for this market. Equilibrium prices naturally emerge in the norm dual of L∞ (Ω, H , µ),
i.e., the set of bounded additive set functions absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ.
But, a price system which is only ﬁnitely additive has no economic interpretation: it makes an arbitrary small set of commodities extraordinarily expensive.
Thus, special care must be taken to ensure that the equilibrium price system is
countably additive.
To apply Bewley’s result, some topological requirements must be satisﬁed
by each consumption set X(i,Ei ) , the production possibility set Y , and each
consumer’s preference mapping from X(i,Ei ) to R. The weak-star topology
on L∞ (Ω, H , µ) is deﬁned to be the topology of pointwise convergence on
L1 (Ω, H , µ); that is, if xλ is a net in L∞ , then xλ → x iﬀ


λ
f (w)x (w)dµ(w) → f (w)x(w)dµ(w),
∀f ∈ L1 .17
The Mackey topology on L∞ (Ω, H , µ) is deﬁned to be the topology of uniform
convergence on weak-star compact, convex circled subsets of
L1 (Ω, H , µ).18 Clearly, the Mackey topology is stronger than the weak-star
topology; that is, if xλ → x in the Mackey topology, then xλ → x also in
the weak-star topology. In other words, any weak-star closed subset of L∞ is
Mackey closed. Bewley requires that each X(i,Ei ) and Y are Mackey closed and
the preference mapping of each consumer is Mackey continuous.
It is easy to see that X(i,Ei ) is weak-star closed; thus, it is also Mackey
closed. The following two lemmas prove the two remaining requirements.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, Y is Mackey closed.
Proof: Let y λ be a net in Y such that y λ → y in the weak-star topology.
λ
By the deﬁnition of Y , for each y λ there exists δ N
λ ∈ ∆(N ) such that y (w) ≤
N
N
N
z (δ λ (w), w) a.e. Since ∆(N ) is compact, we can take a subnet δ λ which
converges to some δ N ∈ ∆(N ) in the norm topology. We then get z N [δ N
λ ] →
N
→
δ
in
the
norm
topology
implies
z N [δ N ] in the weak-star topology, since δ N

λ
N
N
z N (δ N
that z N (δ N
λ (w), w) → z (δ (w), w) a.e., and so
λ (w), w)f (w)dµ(w) →
N
N
z (δ (w), w)f (w)dµ(w),∀f ∈ L1 . Since the nonnegative orthant of L∞ is
weak-star closed, it follows that y(w) ≤ z N (δ N (w), w) a.e. Therefore, y ∈ Y .
From this we conclude that Y is weak-star closed, and hence Mackey closed.
17 For

the deﬁnition of a net, or a generalized sequence, see Dunford and Schwarz [8, p. 26].

18 See

Bewley [5] for a more precise deﬁnition of the Mackey topology.
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We must add the following assumption to ensure the Mackey continuity of
the consumers’ preferences.
Assumption 5. For each i and for each scalar x, there exists a function f in
L1 (Ω, H , µ) for which ui (x, w) ≤ f (w) a.e.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1, 3, and 5, the preferences mapping of each
consumer (i, Ei ), which is a mapping from X(i,Ei ) to R deﬁned by

ui (x(w), w)dµi (w)/µi (Ei ) , ∀x ∈ X(i,Ei ) ,
Ei

is Mackey continuous.
Proof: It is suﬃcient to prove that, for each (i, Ei ), if a net xλ in X(i,Ei )
converges to x ∈ X(i,Ei ) in the weak-star topology and either xλ (w) ≤ x(w)
a.e., ∀λ or xλ (w) ≥ x(w) a. e., ∀λ, then

|ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w)|dµi (w) → 0.19
Ei

If xλ → x in the weak-star topology and xλ (w) ≤ x(w) a.e., ∀λ, then for any
bi
(Ω, H , µ) we have
x ∈ L∞

0 ≤
ui (x (w), w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w)
E
 i
ui ( x ∞ , w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w)
≤
E
 i
f (w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w)
≤
Ei

f (w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµ(w).
≤ n
Ei

Since f ∈ L1 (Ω, H , µ), the last integral converges to zero by the deﬁnition of
convergence in the weak-star topology; thus,

ui (x (w), w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w) → 0.
Ei

The same result holds if xλ → x and xλ (w) ≥ x(w) a.e., ∀λ.
Assume that xλ (w) ≤ x(w) a.e., ∀λ. If x(w) > bi , the concavity and
monotonicity of ui (x, w) in x implies
ui (x(w), w) − ui (xλ (w), w) ≤
19 See

x(w) − xλ (w)
ui (x(w), w).
x(w) − bi

Bewley [5, pp. 535-536] for this argument.
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If x(w) = bi , then xλ (w) = bi and so ui (x(w), w) − ui (xλ (w), w) = 0. For each
t > 0, let Bt = {w ∈ Ei : bi < xi (w) < bi + t} and Ct = {w ∈ Ei : xi (w) ≥
bi + t}. Then, using the above inequality, we get

(ui (x(w), w) − ui (xλ (w), w))dµi (w)
Ei

(ui (x(w), w) − ui (xλ (w), w))dµi (w)
≤
Bt

1
ui (x(w), w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w)
+
Ct t


1
(ui (x(w), w)dµi (w) +
ui (x(w), w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w).
≤
t Ei
Bt
Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily given. Since χBt (w) → 0,∀w ∈ Ei , as t → 0,
there exists t such that Bt ui (x(w), w)dµi (w) < ε/2 by the dominated convergence theorem. Further, we can choose λ1 so large that if λ ≥ λ1 then
u (x(w), w)(x(w) − xλ (w))dµi (w) < εt/2.Then, if λ ≥ λ1 ,
Ei i

(ui (x(w), w) − ui (xλ (w), w))dµi (w) < ε.
Ei

Assume that xλ (w) ≥ x(w) a.e.,∀λ. Let t > 0. If x(w) ≥ bi + t, then
ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w) ≤

xλ (w) − x(w)
ui (x(w), w).
t

If x(w) < bi + t < xλ (w), then
ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w)
= ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (bi + t, w) + ui (bi + t, w) − ui (x(w), w)
xλ (w) − bi − t
≤
ui (bi + t, w) + ui (bi + t, w) − ui (x(w), w)
t
xλ (w) − x(w)
ui (bi + t, w) + ui (bi + t, w)
≤
t
If xλ (w) ≤ bi + t, then
ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w) ≤ ui (bi + t, w)
So we get


(ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w))dµi (w)

1
ui (x(w), w)(xλ (w) − x(w))dµi (w)
≤
t Ei

1
ui (bi + t, w)(xλ (w) − x(w))dµi (w)
+
t Ei

ui (bi + t, w)dµi (w).
+

Ei

Ei
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Since ui (bi , w) = 0, ∀w, and ui (x, w) is continuous and nondecreasing in x,
u (b + t, w)dµi (w) → 0 as t → 0 by the dominated convergence theorem.
Ei i i
Thus, for any given ε > 0, take t so small that Ei ui (bi + t, w)dµi (w) < ε/3.
Choose λ1 such that if λ ≥ λ1 ,

ui (x(w), w)(xλ (w) − x(w))dµi (w) < tε/3
Ei

and


ui (bi + t, w)(xλ (w) − x(w))dµi (w) < tε/3
Ei

Then, if λ ≥ λ1 ,


(ui (xλ (w), w) − ui (x(w), w))dµi (w) < ε.
Ei

Our ﬁnal assumption replaces Bewley’s Adequacy assumption.
Assumption 6. For each i, there exists a strategy δ in ∆({i}) such that
z {i} (δ(w), w) > bi + εi a.e. for some εi > 0.
Theorem 3. Let d = {di }i∈N be a core-compatible budget plan, satisfying for
each i and w: (a) di (π, w) is a continuous function of π on Π w.r.t. the norm
topology of ba(Ω, H , µ); (b) if π and π  in Π satisfy the inequality


N
sup
z (δ(w), w)dπ(w) ≥ sup
z N (δ(w), w)dπ  (w),
δ ∈∆(N )
δ ∈∆(N )
then di (π, w) ≥ di (π  , w),and (c) if {π λ } is a net in Π such that


sup
z N (δ(w), w)dπ λ (w) → sup
z N (δ(w), w)dπ(w),
δ ∈∆(N )
δ ∈∆(N )
then di (π λ , w) → di (π, w). Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, there exists a constrained competitive equilibrium contract relative to d, in which π̄ ∈ Π satisﬁes
π̄(Gi (w)) > 0 for each i and w.
Proof: This is a direct consequence of applying Bewley’s Theorem 1 (which
establishes existence of an equilibrium with a price system π̄  in ba(Ω, H , µ))
and Theorem 3 (which ensures existence of a countably additive price system π̄
corresponding to π̄  ). The monotonicity assumption is satisﬁed due to Assumptions 1 and 3, and the boundedness assumption is satisﬁed due to condition (iv)
of Assumption 2. Bewley’s proof of Theorem 1 must be modiﬁed to adjust for
the fact that the budget plan d may not take the form that each consumer gets
a constant proportion of the producer’s proﬁt. This modiﬁcation is straightforward if d satisﬁes (a), (b), and (c). Assumption 6 and the core-compatibility of
d implies
inf
Eπ {x|Gi } (w)
di (π, w) >
x∈X
(i,Gi (w))
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for each i and w if π(Gi (w)) is positive; hence, the implied allocation of each
consumer (i, Gi (w)) attains maximal preference in his budget set. Thus, there
exists an equilibrium contract with π̄  in ba(Ω, H , µ). Due to Yoshida-Hewitt
Theorem A (Bewley [5, p. 534]), π̄  can be decomposed uniquely into a countably additive set function π̄ and a purely ﬁnitely additive set function π̄ p in
such a way that π̄  = π̄ + π̄ p . Bewley’s Exclusion Assumption is satisﬁed due to
Yoshida-Hewitt Theorem B (Bewley [5, p. 534]), so that his Theorem 3 implies
that this π̄ serves as an equilibrium price system for the previously implied
contract.20

8

An Example

A syndicate is formed by n agents for an opportunity to invest their capital in
a risky project. The syndicate can ﬁnance additional funds by borrowing or
can invest a portion of their capital in a riskless asset in any amount at a ﬁxed
risk-free rate of interest. The problem is to determine the size of the project
and the rule to split the syndicate’s ﬁnal wealth among the members.
First, we develop the problem in accordance with the formulation of Section
2. The basic uncertainty faced by the agents is associated with the rate of return
of the project. Let θ be the project’s rate of return, taking values in a subset
Θ of the real line. We assume that the size of the project does not aﬀect the
stochastic nature of θ . An agent i contributes wi dollars to the formation of the
syndicate’s capital. If α is the proportion of capital invested in the project and
r is the (borrowing and lending) rate of
interest, the syndicate’s ﬁnal wealth is
given as z N (α, θ) = {(1 + r) + α(θ − r)} i∈N wi . The value of α is an arbitrary
nonnegative number, where a value of α larger than one means that they invest
more than their capital in the project and a value of α smaller than one means
that they invest a portion of their capital in the riskless asset.
Diﬀerential information is introduced in the following way. Before the initial
date each agent has observed a private sample which is correlated with θ. The
sample observed by an agent i is denoted by si , whose value is in a set Si . The
state space Ω is then taken to be the product space Θ × ×i∈N Si ≡ Θ × S, whose
elements are of the form (θ, s1 , . . . , sn ) = (θ, s). We assume for simplicity that
the agents obtain no further information before the date of action, at which
time the values of the samples are revealed to each other for the purpose of
investment. The project’s realized rate of return is known to everyone at the
ﬁnal date.
Thus, the informational ﬁeld H which is common to everyone at the date of
contract delivery is the σ-ﬁeld generated by (θ, s1 , . . . , sn ). A strategy δ N of the
syndicate is a function from S to R, which reﬂects the measurability condition
20 In

his Theorem 3 Bewley requires that the production possibility set be a cone, but one
can easily strengthen his proof in such a way that this assumption becomes unnecessary.
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at the date of action. A sharing plan xN is an n-tuple of functions xN
i from
N
N
,
x

is
feasible
for
the
syndicate
iﬀ
it
satisﬁes
the
Θ × S to R.
A
contract
δ

N
N
inequality i∈N xN
(θ,
s)
≤
z
(δ
(s),
θ)
for
each
θ
∈
Θ
and
s
∈
S.
i
We assume that the distribution of (θ, s1 , . . . , sn ), which is assessed by each
agent, has a probability density (or a probability mass function, if these are
discrete random variables). Further, the density of (θ, s1 , . . . , sn ) of agent i is
expressed as the product of φi (θ) and l(s1 , . . . , sn |θ). Namely, the agents may
have diﬀering prior densities of θ , but they agree on the assessment of the
conditional density of (s1 , . . . , sn ) given θ.
To determine a core-compatible budget plan, we must make an assumption
on the investment opportunity available to each subcoalition. The simplest one
is to assume that each subcoalition has no opportunity other than to invest its
capital in the riskless asset. The budget of agent i is a function di from Π × Si
to R, and Deﬁnition 7 yields
di (π, si ) ≤ (1 + r)wi ,

∀i ∈ N.

On the other hand, condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 6 implies that an equilibrium π
must satisfy Eπ {θ − r} = 0;
i.e., the maximum expected wealth achievable by
the syndicate equals (1 + r) i∈N wi . From Deﬁnition 5 it then follows that a
core-compatible budget plan is given as
di (π, si ) = (1 + r)wi ,

∀i ∈ N.

Thus, in this example we can determine uniquely a core-compatible budget plan.
This is due to the assumption that the stochastic nature of the project’s rate of
return is independent of the size of the project and the syndicate can borrow
or lend capital at a ﬁxed interest rate without limit; that is, the syndicate’s
investment opportunity has the property of stochastic constant returns to scale.
The budget plan derived above is actually valid for a wider class of assumptions on the investment opportunity of each subcoalition. Assume that each
subcoalition at least has the riskless opportunity with the interest rate r. Then,
a core-compatible budget plan, if it exists, must have this form due to Deﬁnitions 5 and 7. If, for example, the risky project that the syndicate has is also
available to each subcoalition, then this budget plan satisﬁes all the required
inequalities of Deﬁnition 7. A more general condition was given by Theorem 1.

Logarithmic Utility Functions
Assume that each agent i has the state-independent utility function
ui (x) = log(x − bi ), in which bi is a constant to be interpreted as his minimum wealth for subsistence.21 The risk aversion function22 of ui is given as
21 If an agent i has additional personal income, it should be incorporated in the coeﬃcient
bi . We assume that no agent has additional personal income which is subject to risk.
22 See

Pratt [14] and Arrow [2].
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−1

−ui (x)/ui (x) = (x − bi ) , the reciprocal of a linear function of x. The coeﬃcient of x in this linear function is called the risk cautiousness; the risk
cautiousness of an agent having a logarithmic utility function is one. As for
private information, we ﬁrst consider the restrictive situation described below.
The set of agents N is the union of disjoint sets J and K. Each agent in J
observes the outcome of a common sample s. The agents in K do not observe
s nor any other information. That is, the set J consists of informed agents,
while the set K consists of uninformed agents. This simplifying assumption is
made to study the implication of the presence of diﬀerential information for the
equilibrium contracts in its purest form.
The equilibrium, derived as the solution to (i), (ii), (iii) of Deﬁnition 6,
is the following. Let gi be agent i’s unconditional probability density of s
(i.e., gi (s) = Θ φi (θ)l(s|θ)dθ), and let fi (θ|s) be his posterior density of θ
given s (i.e.,fi (θ|s)
 = φi (θ)l(s|θ)/gi (s)). For simplicity, denote
that wJ =

w
,
w
=
w
,
w
=
w
+w
,
and
similarly
that
b
=
j
K
k
0
J
K
J
k∈K
j∈J bj , bK =
j∈J
b
,
b
=
b
+
b
.
Let
g
(s)
be
the
weighted
average
of
the
unconditional
k
0
J
K
K
k∈K
densities of s of the uninformed members, deﬁned by

[(1 + r)wk − bk ]gk (s)/[(1 + r)wK − bK ].
gK (s) =
k∈K

Deﬁne fJ (θ|s) and fK (θ|s), respectively, by

j∈J [(1 + r)wj − bj ]fj (θ|s)
fJ (θ|s) =
(1 + r)wJ − bJ


and
fK (θ|s) =

+ r)wk − bk ]gk (s)fk (θ|s)
[(1 + r)wK − bK ]gK (s)

k∈K [(1

and let f0 (θ|s) be
f0 (θ|s) =

[(1 + r)wJ − bJ ]fJ (θ|s) + [(1 + r)wK − bK ]fK (θ|s)
.
(1 + r)w0 − b0

Then, the equilibrium strategy is the δ N that satisﬁes

θ−r
f0 (θ|s)dθ = 0,
N
N
Θ z (δ (s), θ) − b0
and the equilibrium sharing plan is given as
xN
j (θ, s)
xN
k (θ, s)

[(1 + r)wj − bj ]fj (θ|s) N N
[z (δ (s), θ) − b0 ],
[(1 + r)w0 − b0 ]f0 (θ|s)
[(1 + r)wk − bk ][gk (s)/gK (s)]fk (θ|s)
= bk +
[(1 + r)w0 − b0 ]f0 (θ|s)
= bj +

×[z N (δ N (s), θ) − b0 ],

∀k ∈ K.23

∀j ∈ J;
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The functions fJ (θ|s), fK (θ|s), and f0 (θ|s) are interpreted as the surrogate
posterior densities of θ given s of the informed, of the uninformed, and of all
the members, respectively. The syndicate’s posterior density is constructed by
taking an arithmetic weighted average of individual posterior densities. The
probability judgment of each member is reﬂected in f0 (θ|s) in proportion to his
net capital contribution, which is deﬁned for member i as (1 + r)wi − bi . The
weight of an uninformed member k is further proportional to gk (s)/gK (s): the
probability he assigns to the event {s = s} relative to the average probability
among the uninformed members. Thus, the opinion of an uninformed member
gets a higher weight in an event to which he assigns a higher probability prior
to communication.
The condition specifying the equilibrium strategy can be rewritten as

d
log[z N (α, θ) − b0 ]f0 (θ|s)dθ|α=δ N (s) = 0.
dα Θ
Namely, the syndicate’s equilibrium strategy is to choose, for each outcome of
the sample s, the size of the project that attains the maximum expected utility
of the syndicate’s wealth with respect to the density f0 (θ|s).24 The surrogate
utility function to be used is the logarithmic function whose subsistence coeﬃcient equals the sum b0 of individual subsistence coeﬃcients.25
The equilibrium sharing plan is to split the syndicate’s wealth in excess
of the aggregate subsistence level among the members in a linear fashion, in
addition to paying each a sure income of the amount equal to his subsistence
wealth. The rule involves bets due to diﬀerences in the members’ subjective
probability judgments. Each member obtains, in a state (θ, s), a share of wealth
in proportion to his net capital contribution and his probability assessment of
the event {θ = θ} given {s = s}. The share of an uninformed member k is
further proportional to gk (s)/gK (s).
If there is agreement on the prior probability assessment of θ among the
uninformed members, then the equilibrium reduces to the following. The syndicate’s posterior density of θ is

[(1 + r)wi − bi ]fi (θ|s)
,
f0 (θ|s) = i∈N
(1 + r)w0 − b0
23 The

density of the equilibrium π is given as
[(1 + r)w0 − b0 ]gK (s)

f0 (θ|s)
z N (δN (s), θ) − b0

.

24 If the expected utility is monotone increasing in α, then there exists no equilibrium. The
situation dealt with in the example is not covered by the existence theorem (Theorem 4),
since the action space is not compact.
25 The decomposition of “group preferences” into surrogate utility and surrogate probability
functions, as observed here, is of a more general nature. See Wilson [20] and Kobayashi [10].
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and the wealth allocated to agent i is
xN
i (θ, s) = bi +

[(1 + r)wi − bi ]fi (θ|s) N N
[z (δ (s), θ) − b0 ],
[(1 + r)w0 − b0 ]f0 (θ|s)

∀i ∈ N.

One can easily verify that this coincides with the equilibrium contract for the
situation in which the informed members reveal the value of the sample to
the uninformed members at or before the initial date (full-communication equilibrium). This result is not surprising. The basic feature of the notions of
the conditional core and that of the constrained competitive equilibrium is to
allow informationally inferior agents to insure collectively against the proprietary information held by others. It is the possibility of such mutual insurance
activities that distinguishes the constrained competitive equilibrium from the
full-communication equilibrium. If all the uninformed members agree on the
probability judgment of the sample s, there remains no room for them to bet
on s. In other words, agreement on the probability assessment of s among
the uninformed members excludes the opportunity to insure among themselves
against the commonly unknown sample.26
As one can predict, the previous conclusion can be extended to the more general situation in which the members observe diﬀerent private samples. That is, if
all the members have identical prior probability judgment of θ, then the equilibrium contract coincides with the full-communication equilibrium contract. The
strategy is the one that maximizes, for each outcome of the joint sample, the
conditional expected utility of the syndicate’s wealth. It is to be calculated by
using the logarithmic utility function with the subsistence coeﬃcient b0 and the
common posterior distribution of θ given the joint sample. The sharing plan is
to allocate each member a sure income which equals his subsistence wealth and
to split the syndicate’s wealth in excess of b0 in proportion to the members’ net
capital contributions.

Exponential Utility Functions
Consider the case in which all the agents have exponential utility functions. The
utility function of agent i is ui (x) = − exp(−x/ρi ), where ρi is a positive number
to be called the risk tolerance coeﬃcient.27 First, we exhibit the nature of the
equilibrium strategy for the general case in which the agents observe diﬀerent
private samples. Deﬁne f0 (θ|s) by

ρ /ρ
[fi (θ|s)] i 0 ,
f0 (θ|s) = c
i∈N
26 If the members had additional personal wealths that were random and correlated with
the sample, then there would still be opportunities for the uninformed members to share the
private risks across diﬀerent values of the random sample. The equilibrium, then, would be
diﬀerent from the full-communication equilibrium.
27 This utility function satisﬁes the property −u (x)/u (x) = ρ−1 ; namely, the function has
i
i
i
constant risk aversion. The risk cautiousness of ui is zero.
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where ρ0 ≡ i∈N ρi and c is a normalization constant. Then, the equilibrium
strategy is given by

δ N (s) ∈ arg max
− exp[−z N (α, θ)/ρ0 ]f0 (θ|s)dθ
α≥0

Θ

for each outcome of the joint sample s = (s1 , . . . , sn ).28 After revealing the
values of the private samples, the syndicate chooses the size of the project so as
to maximize the conditional expected utility of its ﬁnal wealth. The syndicate’s
posterior density of θ is constructed by taking a geometric average of individual
posterior densities, in which each member is given a weight proportional to
the magnitude of his risk tolerance. The syndicate’s utility function is the
exponential function whose risk tolerance equals the sum of all the individual
risk tolerances.
The equilibrium sharing plan is of the form



φ
(θ)
(s
)
ρ
λ
i
i
i
i
z N (δ N (s), θ) + ρi log
,
+ ρi log 
xN
i (θ, s) =
ρi /ρ0
ρ0
φ0 (θ)
j∈N [λj (sj )]
where φ0 (θ) ≡ Πi∈N (φi (θ))ρi /ρ0 and λi is a known function of si .29 The share of
each agent is the sum of adividend and two additional random payments. The
dividend is determined by the condition that the agents split the syndicate’s
wealth in proportion to the magnitudes of their risk tolerances. The middle
term reﬂects a side bet on θ. The last term is a random payment which depends
on the realized values of the private samples.
The peculiar features of the equilibrium contract, in comparison with the
equilibrium contract implied by logarithmic utilities, are two-fold. The weight of
each agent’s probability assessment in constructing the syndicate’s assessment is
solely determined by his attitude toward risk, and is not aﬀected by the amount
of capital he contributes to the syndicate. Further, the aggregate risk tolerance
is the sum of the individual risk tolerances, so that the syndicate can bear more
risk as the number of members increases. These properties depend critically on
the result that when the members have constant risk tolerances, eﬃcient sharing
of risk requires that the risk be shared among the individuals in proportion to
their risk tolerances.30
It is worth noting that the equilibrium strategy coincides with the one associated with the full-communication equilibrium. That is, in the case of exponential
utilities, the presence of diﬀerential information does not aﬀect the form of the
equilibrium strategy; it does not make any diﬀerence whether the agents reveal
28 See

footnote 25.

29 It

is important that λi is a function of si but independent of the other samples. It captures
the peculiar requirement of eﬃciency with diﬀerential information that the marginal utility
of income of each agent be measurable with respect to his information (see Kobayashi [10]).
30 For eﬃciency risk should be shared at the margin in proportion to risk tolerances, no
matter what the utility functions are. This basic property of eﬃcient risk sharing was ﬁrst
discovered by Wilson [20] (see also Wilson [21]).
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their private information before or after the contract is established.31 If there
is agreement on the prior probability assessment of θ among all the members,
then the equilibrium sharing plan also coincides with the one associated with
the full-communication equilibrium, and it is given by


ρi N N
ρi
N
xi (θ, s) = z (δ (s), θ) + (1 + r) wi − w0 .
ρ0
ρ0

9

Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to develop a conceptual framework for solving
the syndicate problem when agents have diﬀerent information about the state
of nature. The basic solution concept was the conditional core. The constrained
competitive equilibrium contracts were shown to be core-compatible with the
choice of an appropriate budget plan. The analysis of an example showed that
the equilibrium contracts have appealing properties when every individual agent
has unit risk cautiousness and when every individual agent has zero risk cautiousness. It was conjectured that the conditional core shrinks to the set of
equilibrium contracts as the number of agents participating in the syndicate
approaches to inﬁnity.
The deﬁnition of the conditional core was based on the assumption that the
agents are reluctant to reveal their private information when they negotiate on
the terms of a contract. As such, the conditional core is the one that retains the
greatest opportunity for mutual insurance subject to the limitation inherent
in the presence of diﬀerential information. An explicit consideration of the
strategic aspects of information, such as problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection, would require formulation as a noncooperative game.
The concept of the constrained competitive equilibria may be regarded as
a substitute for the Arrow-Debreu equilibria for economies under uncertainty
in which traders come to the market with diﬀerent prior information about the
environment. The critical idea was to prohibit inside trades: a trader is not
allowed to sell a contract for delivery contingent on an event that he already
knows could not occur. A later paper will study the institutional form of a
market mechanism which achieves a core allocation of risk with the presence of
diﬀerential information, in relation to diﬀering degrees of completeness of the
market.

31 This was also the case when the utility functions were logarithmic and there was agreement
on the prior probability assessment of θ. The general condition for such coincidence is given
in Kobayashi [10].
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